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Commercial Law
By RICHARD H. NowKA*
The Kentucky Uniform Commercial Code,' although enacted
in 1958 and effective July 1, 1960,2 contains numerous sections
which have not yet been interpreted by the Kentucky appellate
courts. 3 However, this is changing due to the evergrowing num-
ber of commercial transactions which provide the courts with
opportunities to construe the Kentucky Uniform Commercial
Code (Code).
From the cases interpreting the Code4 since the last com-
mercial law survey5 was completed, I have chosen three on which
to comment. In Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Metcalfe,6 the
Kentucky Court of Appeals defined the Kentucky Revised Stat-
utes (KRS) section 355.9-504(3) requirement that notice of a sale
of repossessed collateral be sent to the debtor. In J.L Case Co.
v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp.,7 the Kentucky Court of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Louisville. B.S. 1973, Wayne State
College; J.D. 1976, Creighton University, School of Law.
I Ky. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§ 355.1-101 to 10-102 (Bobbs-Merrill 1970 & Cum. Supp.
1984) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
2 1958 Ky. Acts, ch. 77, §§ 1-101 to 10-108.
Of the 385 substantive sections of the Kentucky Uniform Commercial Code,
only 54 sections had been the subject of a reported decision by a Kentucky appellate
court as of Sept. 1, 1983.
4 See Hutchison v. C.I.T. Corp., 726 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984) (discussing perfec-
tion of a security interest by possession under KRS § 355.9-305); Tresslar Co. v. Fritts,
665 S.W.2d 314 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (KRS § 355.3-416(1) not applicable to letter of
guarantee not executed with commercial instrument); Richardson v. First Nat'l Bank of
Louisville, 660 S.W.2d 678 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983) (clerical error not sufficient to discharge
a negotiable instrument under KRS § 355.3-605(1)(a) and signers personally responsible
for debt where no evidence of representative capacity under KRS § 355.3-403(2)); Brooks
v. United Kentucky Bank, 659 S.W.2d 213 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983) ("continuing guarantee"
not within purview of KRS § 355.3-115(1)); Commissioner, Dep't of Educ. v. Gravitt,
31 Ky. L. Summ. 4, at 3 (Ky. Ct. App. March 9, 1984) [hereinafter cited as KLS]
(discussing measure of damages for breach of Article Two warranty under KRS §§
355.2-714(2), 2-715 (1970)); Kane v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 31 KLS 3, at
7 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 1984) (continuing guarantee not Article Three negotiable
instrument under KRS § 355.3-606).
1 See Nowka, Kentucky Law Survey - Commercial Law, 72 Ky. L.J. 336 (1983-
84) (surveying commercial law cases decided during the period from approximately June
of 1982 to June of 1983).
6 663 S.W.2d 957 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
7 669 S.W.2d 543 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
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Appeals determined the priority between competing security in-
terests in goods repossessed by a secured creditor and returned
to the debtor's inventory. In North Ridge Farms, Inc. v. Trim-
ble,8 the court of appeals examined the rights of a secured
creditor with a security interest in a fractional share of Affirmed,
thoroughbred racing's last Triple Crown winner, vis a vis a buyer
of an annual breeding season to Affirmed.
I. NOTICE OF SALE OF COLLATERAL AFTER
DEFALT-KRS 355.9-504(3)
In Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Metcalfe,9 the Kentucky
Court of Appeals considered both the statutory requirement that
a secured party send notice to the debtor of the intended dis-
position of the collateral and the effect of a failure to provide
such notice.10 Herbert H. Metcalfe, Sr., and Evelyn Metcalfe
cosigned a contract for the purchase of a vehicle by Herbert H.
Metcalfe, Jr. The purchase contract, which created a security
interest in the vehicle, was assigned to Central Bank & Trust
Company (Central Bank). When default in the payment of the
secured obligation occurred, the bank repossessed the vehicle for
the purpose of resale.
KRS section 355.9-504(3) provides that "reasonable notifi-
cation of the time and place of any public sale or reasonable
notification of the time after which any private sale or other
intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured
party to the debtor." In an attempt to fulfill this requirement
with respect to Evelyn and Herbert, Sr., Central Bank mailed a
notice in one envelope addressed to "Mr. & Mrs. Herbert H.
Metcalfe, Sr." at the address on the contract. The collateral was
subsequently sold. Application of the proceeds of sale to the
indebtedness produced a deficiency of $6,610.68, and Central
Bank filed suit for the deficiency." When the circuit court granted
summary judgment in Evelyn's favor, both in her individual
capacity and in her capacity as administrator of the estate of
30 KLS 15, at 2 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 1983).
663 S.W.2d 957 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
1o See 663 S.W.2d at 960.
" Id. at 958. Evelyn was sued in her individual and fiduciary capacities since she
was administrator of the estate of Herbert H. Metcalfe, Sr., deceased. Id.
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Herbert, Sr., Central Bank appealed. The court of appeals framed
the issue as whether Central Bank gave reasonable notification
of the sale of the vehicle to both Herbert, Sr., and Evelyn. 12
Although the court stated that the only question was whether
there had been proper notification, an underlying issue was the
effect of lack of proper notification on the ability of the secured
party to obtain a deficiency judgment.'3 This Article will explore
both issues.
The court stated that in order to recover a deficiency judg-
ment resulting from the sale of collateral, all of the provisions
of KRS section 355.9-504 must be fulfilled. 14 Section 9-504(3)
provides two separate requirements for disposition of collateral:
(1) every aspect of the disposition must be commercially
reasonable' 5 and (2) the secured party must send notice of the
sale. 16
Consistent with the majority of courts 7 and citing Bank
Josephine v. Conn,18 a previous Kentucky Court of Appeals
decision, the court placed the burden on the secured party to
prove it had acted with commercial reasonableness in selling the
collateral.19 Stating that commercial reasonableness includes
sending notice of the sale to the debtor, 20 the court also placed
the burden of proving notice on Central Bank. 2'
12 Id.
" "In order to recover a deficiency judgment resulting from a sale of collateral all
of the provisions of KRS 355.9-504 must be met." Id. (emphasis added).
14 Id.
11 KRS § 355.9-504(3) states in part: "Sale or other disposition may be as a unit
or in parcels and at any time and place and on any terms but every aspect of the
disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially
reasonable." See generally Annot., 7 A.L.R. 4th 308 (1981) (discussing what is "com-
mercially reasonable" disposition of collateral as required by UCC § 9-504(3)).
16 See KRS § 355.9-504(3).
" See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Bellevue v. Rose, 196 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Neb.
1972); Don Jenkins & Son Ford-Mercury Inc. v. Catlette, 297 S.E.2d 409, 410 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1982); First Nat'l Bank [of] New Bremen v. Turner, 439 N.E.2d 1259, 1263
(Ohio Ct. App. 1981). See also D. LamsON & R. NowKA, TBE UNIFosu CoMMERcIAL
CODE OF KENTUCKY § 8.6(G) (1983).
,1 599 S.W.2d 773 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
,9 See 663 S.W.2d at 959.
11 See id. The court stated, "The burden is on the secured party to prove it acted
with commercial reasonableness in accomplishing the sale .... This includes notification
to the debtor of the sale." Id. (citation omitted).
21 See id.
1985]
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The court erred by including the sending of reasonable notice
as part of the duty of commercial reasonableness. KRS section
355.9-504(3) imposes two requirements on a secured party dis-
posing of collateral-commercially reasonable disposition and
sending reasonable notification of the disposition. Under the
language of section 9-504(3), these requirements are separate and
independent:
Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and at
any time and place and on any terms but every aspect of the
disposition including the method, manner, time, place and
terms must be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is
perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a
type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable no-
tification of the time and place of any public sale or reasonable
notification of the time after which any private sale or other
intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured
party to the debtor. ....
Nevertheless, the court reached the correct result when it
found the bank's notification inadequate. The notice of sale was
addressed to "Mr. & Mrs. Herbert H. Metcalfe, Sr." However,
the contract was signed as "Herbert H. Metcalfe, Sr." and
"Evelyn Metcalfe." 24 Finding no indication in the written doc-
umentation that Evelyn and Herbert, Sr., were married to each
other, the court stated:
We do not think it reasonable for the bank to assume that
appellant and her husband were husband and wife, or that
they would remain married or residents at the same address.
The reasonable conduct for the bank to take would have been
to mail 2 separate notices to Evelyn and Herbert, Sr.25
Evelyn did not reside at the address to which the notice was
mailed, and she did not receive the notice. 26 However, the bank
- See KRS § 355.9-504(3). See also D. LIEBSON & R. NoWKA, supra note 17, §
3.3(c), at 840-47; J. WroTE & R. SumMERs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UIFnoRM
COMMERCIAL CODE, §§ 26-29 (2d ed. 1980).
KRS § 355.9-504(3) (emphasis added).
24 663 S.W.2d at 959.
2 Id.
2 Id.
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had mailed the notice to the address indicated on the contract. 27
The secured party is required only to send reasonable notifica-
tion:
"Send" in connection with any writing or notice means to
deposit in the mail or deliver for transmission by any other
usual means of communication with postage or cost of trans-
mission provided for and properly addressed and in the case
of an instrument to an address specified thereon or otherwise
agreed, or if there be none to any address reasonable under
the circumstances.8
Unless the bank had received notice of Evelyn's correct
address, it acted reasonably in sending notice of sale to the
address indicated on the contract. There is no requirement that
the debtor receive the notice;29 KRS section 9-504(3) requires
only that "reasonable notification ' 30 be sent. The secured party
fulfills its duty when reasonable notification is sent, whether or
not the debtor ever receives the notice. Thus, the court of appeals
was correct in agreeing with the bank's contention that it was
immaterial that Evelyn neither lived at the indicated address nor
received notice. 31
Sending the notice to the address listed on the contract was
not unreasonable. However, considering that Evelyn did not
reside at that address and that the notice was not addressed to
Evelyn, the court concluded that two separate notices should
have been sent: "By so doing, the appellant could then have
reasonably assumed that, if one of these two persons was no
longer living at the address appearing on the notice, the postal
service would, by forwarding, transmit the correspondence to
7 Id.
- KRS § 355.1-201(38) (1970).
- KRS § 355.1-201(26) provides in pertinent part whether or not the person actually
comes to know of it, "[a] person 'receives' a notice or notification when (a) it comes
to his attention; or (b) it is duly delivered at the place of business through which the
contract was made. .. "
" "Reasonable notification" is not defined in Article Nine of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. However, the Commentary to KRS § 355.9-504 states: "[A]t a minimum,
[reasonable notification] contemplates notice sent in such time that persons entitled to
receive it will have sufficient time to protect their interests by taking part in the sale or
other disposition if they so desire."
11 See 663 S.W.2d at 959.
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that person at his or her new address." ' 32 Thus, the court held
that Central Bank "did not meet its burden as to the commercial
reasonableness of notice to Evelyn individually. 33
The court of appeals found no similar unreasonableness with
respect to the notice to Herbert, Sr. Although Evelyn had moved
to a different address, "there was no evidentiary indication that
Herbert Sr. had moved."3 4 Thus, Central Bank could have "rea-
sonably anticipate[d] that delivery would be made to the ad-
dressee who remained at the address on the envelope. ' ' 3s
According to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, the critical
factor in determining whether reasonable notification was sent
"is the reasonable expectation ... it would be transmitted to
the addressee. ' 36 The court's designation of the expectation of
transmission of the notice to the addressee as the critical factor
in the "send" issue comports with the ostensible purpose behind
the definition of "send." "Send" requires that postage be pro-
vided and a proper address be employed.3 7 These requirements
seem designed to foster a reasonable expectation that the notice
will be transmitted to the addressee. Central Bank's expectation
was unreasonable as to Evelyn because the Bank failed to send
her an individual notice which could have been forwarded in the
mails.38 The Bank's expectation was reasonable as to Herbert,
Sr., because his name appeared in the address and there was no
evidence he had moved.
As noted previously, the court reached the correct result even
though it incorrectly included the duty of sending reasonable
notification within the duty of making a commercially reasonable
disposition. Had the court separated the two duties, the same
result would have been reached under a different rationale.
KRS section 355.9-504(3) mandates that "reasonable notifi-
cation . . . shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor."
The duty of "reasonable notification" should be limited to
situations where the issue is the content or timeliness of the
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 960.
35 Id. at 939-60.
26 Id. at 959.
3 See text accompanying note 28 supra.
31 663 S.W.2d at 959.
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notice. 9 The independent duty that notice be "sent" would
concern whether notice is sent at all and whether it is correctly
addressed. Since the issue in Central Bank & Trust Co. v.
Metcalfe was whether the notice was properly sent, its resolution
turned on the definition of "send."
"Send" means "to deposit in the mail ... properly ad-
dressed.'"'4 The contract indicated the debtors were Herbert, Jr.,
Evelyn, and Herbert, Sr. A notice which was not addressed to
"Evelyn Metcalfe" was not "properly addressed" and thus was
not sent. If notice was not sent, then the duty of section 9-
504(3) was not fulfilled.
As noted before, an underlying issue was the effect of failure
to comply with section 9-504(3) on the secured party's ability to
recover a deficiency. Central Bank brought suit to recover the
deficiency existing after proceeds of the sale of the vehicle were
applied to the debt. Evelyn Metcalfe, individually and as admin-
istrator of the estate of Herbert, Sr., defended the deficiency
suit on the ground that the requirements of section 9-504(3) had
not been met. The court of appeals agreed with the theory of
the defense: "In order to recover a deficiency judgment resulting
from sale of collateral, all of the provisions of KRS section
355.9-504 must be complied with. '41
Although the court did not cite Bank Josephine v. Conn42
in support of this statement, the court hearing that case had
reached the same conclusion.4 3 In Bank Josephine, a suit for a
deficiency was denied on the ground the secured party had
"failed to act with commercial reasonableness and, therefore,
was estopped from securing a deficiency judgment against the
appellees." 44
11 See UCC § 9-504 comment 5 (1972); J. WH= & R-Summs, supra note 22,
at 1112.
- KRS § 355.1-201(38).
4 663 S.W.2d at 959.
599 S.W.2d 773.
,' See id. at 775.
" Id. Note that another Kentucky case arguably implies that a commercially
reasonable sale is a condition precedent to a deficiency judgment. See Cox Motor Car
Co. v. Castle, 402 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1966). In Cox the secured party, after repossession
of the collateral, sought recovery of the unpaid balance of the purchase price. The court
denied the recovery holding that the secured party, having repossessed the collateral,
"was required to liquidate it at reasonable public sale, as a condition to seeking further
recovery" from the debtor. Id. at 432. It seems that the court was merely stating the
procedure for recovery of a deficiency, i.e., disposition of collateral and application of
proceeds thereof to the unpaid indebtedness before any deficiency is warranted.
1985]
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The issue of whether to allow a secured party who has not
complied with section 9-504(3) to recover a deficiency has been
faced by many courts. Article Nine gives little guidance on the
subject. Subsection (2) of KRS section 355.9-504 provides that
the debtor is liable for any deficiency unless otherwise agreed. 45
Subsection (1) of KRS section 355.9-507 provides that the se-
cured party is liable for any loss caused by a failure to comply
with Part Five of Article Nine.41 Courts have responded to the
issue in three ways.
Some courts have denied any recovery of a deficiency when
the secured party failed to comply with the requirements of
section 9-504(3). The reasoning of this approach is illustrated by
Camden National Bank v. St. Clair,47 where the secured party
claimed that section 9-507(1) provided the exclusive remedy for
its failure to comply with section 9-504(3). In St. Clair, the
secured party had failed to give notice of the disposition. First,
the court found that section 9-507(1) is not an exclusive remedy.48
Second, since section 9-507(1) is not expressly exclusive, 49 the
court found section 1-1035o instructive in providing that, unless
41 KRS § 355.9-504(2) provides:
If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party must
account to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, the
debtor is liable for any deficiency. But if the underlying transaction was a
sale of accounts, contract rights, or chattel paper, the debtor is entitled to
any surplus or is liable for any deficiency only if the security agreement
so provides.
KRS § 355.9-507(1) states:
If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in accord-
ance with the provision of this part disposition may be ordered or restrained
on appropriate terms and conditions. If the disposition has occurred the
debtor or any person entitled to notification or whose security interest has
been made known to the secured party prior to the disposition has a right
to recover from the secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply
with the provisions of this part. If the collateral is consumer goods, the
debtor has a right to recover in any event an amount not less than the
credit service charge plus ten percent (10%) of the principal amount of the
debt or the time price differential plus ten percent (10%) of the cash price.
47 309 A.2d 329 (Me. 1973).
41 Id. at 332 ("[T]he § 9-507(1) cause of action is only one of a plurality of
remedies available to the debtor.").
49 See note 46 supra.
10 UCC § 1-103 provides: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this
Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative
to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress,
coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement
its provisions."
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displaced by particular provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC), remedies previously or otherwise afforded are sup-
plemental to the UCC. 51 Pre-UCC case law generally denied an
action for a deficiency when the disposition was not properly
conducted.5 2 In St. Clair, the court refused to award a deficiency
and held that compliance with the notice provisions of section
9-504(3) is a condition precedent to the right of the secured party
to recover a deficiency.5 3
A second approach, rapidly gaining popularity, is typified
by Norton v. National Bank of Commerce.5 4 In Norton, as in
St. Clair, a failure to give notice of the disposition was the
statutory defect. In rejecting the debtor's contention that failure
to give notice completely discharged liability for any deficiency,
the court stated:
Upon the issue of Norton's damages simple considerations
of fair play cast the burden of proof upon the bank. It was
the bank which wrongfully disposed of the car without notice
to the debtors. Thus it was the bank's action that made it at
least difficult, if not impossible, for Norton to prove the extent
of his loss with reasonable certainty. A chattel such as a car
may well be a thousand miles away before the debtor learns
of its sale without notice. It would be manifestly unfair for
the creditor to derive an advantage from its own misconduct.
We think the just solution is to indulge the presumption in the
first instance that the collateral was worth at least the amount
of the debt, thereby shifting to the creditor the burden of
11 309 A.2d at 332.
52 See, e.g., Bulldog Concrete Forms Sales Corp. v. Taylor, 195 F.2d 417 (7th Cir.
1952) (deficiency judgment rendered where all requirements of notice and resale were
met); Frantz Equip. Co. v. Anderson, 181 A.2d 499 (N.J. 1962) (defective notice of
resale deprives seller of his right to seek a deficiency judgment); United Sec. Corp. v.
Tomlin, 198 A.2d 179 (Del. Super. Ct. 1964) (failure to give notice of sale and to
conduct sale at public auction deprives seller of right to judgment for balance due).
53 See 309 A.2d at 333. Accord Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F.
Supp. 696, 702 (W.D. Pa. 1963), vacated on other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3rd Cir.
1964); Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315, 321 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); Herman
Ford-Mercury, Inc. v. Betts, 251 N.W.2d 492, 496 (Iowa 1977).
- 398 S.W.2d 538 (Ark. 1966). See also Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d
87, 91 (Alaska 1969); Levers v. Rio King Land & Inv. Co., 560 P.2d 917, 920 (Nev.
1977); Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 276 A.2d 402, 404-05 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1971),
aff'd, 288 A.2d 872 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972).
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proving the amount that should reasonably have been obtained
through a sale conducted according to law.5
This approach results in the presumption that the collateral
was worth at least the amount of the debt. The secured party
can recover a deficiency only by first overcoming this presump-
tion. An appraisal of the value of the collateral, followed by a
good faith effort to obtain the highest price, has been held to
overcome the presumption. 56 It is questionable, however, whether
this second approach does any more than throw a tidbit to the
hungry creditor. Quite probably the courts will require a greater
showing than the secured party's estimate of the collateral's fair
market value, and thus the ability to overcome the presumption
may be more illusory than real.
A third approach is illustrated in Wilson Leasing Co. v.
Seaway Pharmacal Corp.5 7 where it was found that disposition
of the collateral in violation of the UCC does not absolve the
debtor of liability for a deficiency.58 However, the debtor is
permitted to recover for any loss under secton 9-507(l).19 The
amount of damages to the debtor resulting from the secured
party's failure to follow UCC requirements can be set off against
the deficiency 0
It appears that the only difference between the second and
third approaches is the allocation of the burden of proof of the
fair market value of the collateral and thus of the amount of
loss suffered by the debtor. Under the second approach, the
secured party must overcome the presumption that the fair mar-
ket value of the collateral was equal to the amount of the debt.
In effect, this compels the secured party to show that his non-
compliance with the UCC did not result in loss to the debtor.
Under the third approach, the debtor bears ,the burden of prov-
ing loss. If the debtor does so, then-where the collateral was
not a consumer good-the amount of loss is offset against the
1 398 S.W.2d at 542.
6 See Levers v. Rio King Land & Inv. Co., 560 P.2d at 920.
11 220 N.W.2d 83 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974). See also Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Hurst,
570 P.2d 1031, 1033-34 (Utah 1977); Associates Fin. Serv. Co., Inc. v. DiMarco, 383
A.2d 296, 302 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978).
11 220 N.W.2d at 89.
59 See KRS § 355.9-507(1).
60 Jones v. Morgan, 228 N.W.2d 419, 423 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975).
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amount of deficiency. 6' If the collateral was a consumer good,
the loss is offset only if it is greater than the statutory damages
provided in section 9-507(1).62
The third approcah seems to be more consistent with the
language of Article Nine. KRS section 355.9-507(1) gives the
debtor a remedy for the secured party's breach of duty. If the
secured party breaches its duty under section 9-504(3), it is liable
under section 9-507(1) for any loss caused. 63 To further deny the
secured party's right to a deficiency may unfairly penalize the
secured party. However, after Central Bank & Trust Co. v.
Metcalfe and Bank Josephine v. Conn, Kentucky seems to be
aligned with the jurisdictions which completely deny deficiency
judgments for failure to comply with section 9-504(3).
II. CHATTEL PAPER AND REPOSSESSED
GoODs-KRS 355.9-306(5) & 9-308
In J.I. Case Co. v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp.,64 the
Kentucky Court of Appeals considered the complex provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code relating to the priority of
security interests in repossessed goods. J.I. Case Company (Case),
a manufacturer of farm equipment, sold farm equipment to
Island Equipment Company (Island), an equipment dealer, for
the purpose of resale. At issue in the controversy were two pieces
of equipment sold by Case to Island pursuant to a "Wholesale
Financing & Security Agreement" whereby Case retained and
perfected a security interest in the equipment and also in Island's
inventory, repossessions, and proceeds. Island sold the pieces of
equipment pursuant to two separate retail installment contracts.
Island assigned these contracts to Borg-Warner Acceptance Cor-
poration (Borg-Warner). When both purchasers of the equip-
ment defaulted on the retail installment contracts, Borg-Warner
" See id. at 423.
- See KRS § 355.9-507(1).
63 See id.
' 669 S.W.2d 543 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984). After rendering an opinion in favor of
J.I. Case Company on Sept. 30, 1983, the court of appeals granted Borg-Warner's
petition for rehearing. Subsequently the court withdrew its Sept. 30, 1983 opinion and
issued a new opiriion on Feb. 10, 1984. This later opinion overturned the previous
holding and its rationale and held Borg-Warner had the superior interest in the repos-
sessed goods. Id. at 543, 546.
1985]
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repossessed the equipment and placed it with the inventory of
Island. After Island defaulted on its obligation to Case, Case
obtained a writ of possession authorizing it to take all of Case's
equipment in Island's possession. Case subsequently obtained
possession of this equipment, including the two pieces repos-
sessed by Borg-Warner. Borg-Warner demanded that Case sur-
render the equipment. When Case refused, the priority of the
conflicting security interests in the goods was placed in issue.65
The court, on rehearing, first noted the security interest of
Case in the two pieces of equipment was extinguished pursuant
to KRS section 355.9-306(2) when Island sold the equipment. 66
KRS section 355.9-306(2) provides that "a security interest con-
tinues in collateral notwithstanding sale ... by the debtor unless
his action was authorized by the secured party." Since Case
authorized Island to sell the equipment, Case's security interest
in the equipment was extinguished.67
However, the security agreement between Case and Island
extended Case's security interest to the proceeds of the collateral,
and thus Case maintained a security interest in the proceeds
under KRS section 355.9-306(2). 8 The proceeds received by Is-
land consisted of retail installment contracts. 69 These contracts
must have evidenced a monetary obligation owed by the pur-
chasers and a security interest in the equipment purchased be-
cause the court characterized the proceeds as chattel paper.70
KRS section 355.9-105(l)(b) defines a chattel paper as "a writing
or writings which evidence both a monetary obligation and a
security interest in or a lease of specific goods." Thus, Case had
a security interest in the chattel paper which was created by the
sale of equipment.
The assignment of the chattel paper to Borg-Warner created
a security interest in Borg-Warner's favor with the chattel paper
as collateral. A security interest was created whether the trans-
action was a security assignment or in fact a sale of the chattel
65 Id. at 545.
66Id.
67 Id.
61 Id. at 546. KRS § 355.9-306(2) provides that notwithstanding sale "a security
interest ... continues in any proceeds including collections received by the debtor."
69 669 S.W.2d at 545.
10 See id. at.545-47.
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paper to Borg-Warner. Under KRS section 355.9-102, the pro-
visions of Article Nine apply both to security interests created
by assignment 71 and to sales of chattel paper.72 Thus, both Case
and Borg-Warner had security interests in the chattel paper.
Had there been a default by Island in its obligation to Case
prior to default by the purchasers of the equipment and reposs-
ession of the equipment by Borg-Warner, the priority contest
would have been resolved by determining whether Borg-Warner
or Case had priority in the chattel paper under KRS section
355.9-308.73 Repossession of the equipment does not change the
resolution of the dispute even though the issue shifted to the
priority of the parties' security interests in the equipment. 74
The court of appeals first discussed the section 355.9-308
priority determination as to chattel paper. The second sentence
of section 355.9-308 provides:
A purchaser of chattel paper who gives new value and takes
possession of it in the ordinary course of his business has
priority over a security interest in chattel paper which is claimed
merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a security interest,
even though he knows that the specific paper is subject to the
security interest. 75
Having already noted the security interest of Case in the
goods was extinguished upon sale, the court further found Case
had a security interest in the chattel paper as proceeds of the
equipment.7 6 Without discussing the remaining conditions of
priority under section 355.9-308, the court held that Borg-War-
ner had obtained priority in the chattel paper.77
In order to find Borg-Warner had a superior interest in the
chattel paper, the court must have found Borg-Warner fulfilled
the requirements of section 355.9-308. First, Borg-Warner must
11 See KRS § 355.9-102(2).
7 See KRS § 355.9-102(1)(b).
73 See text accompanying note 75 infra.
74 See text accompanying notes 80-89 infra.
11 KRS § 355.9-308 (emphasis added).
76 See 669 S.W.2d at 546. The court must have decided Case claimed a security
interest in the chattel paper "merely" as proceeds of inventory. This conclusion is
reached because the court determined priority under the second sentence of KRS § 355.9-
308, and that section operates only when the security interest in chattel paper "is claimed
merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a security interest." KRS § 359.9-308.
See 669 S.W.2d at 546.
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have been a purchaser of chattel paper. "Purchase" is defined
to include "taking by sale, discount, negotiation, mortgage,
pledge, lien, issue or reissue, gift or any other voluntary trans-
action creating an interest in property.' '78 Since the chattel paper
was "assigned" to it, Borg-Warner undoubtedly took the chattel
paper either by "sale" or as security which could be considered
taking by "lien." Hence Borg-Warner was a purchaser. Second,
Borg-Warner must have given "new value." Since the chattel
paper was "assigned" to Borg-Warner, the assignment was prob-
ably made for value given in the form of money. 79 An assignment
of chattel paper as security for, or in satisfaction of, a pre-
existing debt would not have involved "new" value. Third, Borg-
Warner must have taken possession of the chattel paper. The
facts of the case do not indicate whether Borg-Warner took
possession of the chattel paper, but a normal course of dealing
in an assignment situation would be for the assignee (Borg-
Warner) to take possession. Finally, Borg-Warner must have
been acting in its ordinary course of business in "purchasing"
and "taking possession" of the chattel paper. No factual finding
as to this requirement was made, but Borg-Warner was obviously
a credit institution (i.e., Borg-Warner Acceptance Corporation)
and thus could have purchased and possessed chattel paper in
its ordinary course of business.
Repossession of the equipment by Borg-Warner brought KRS
section 355.9-306(5) into operation: "If a sale of goods results
in an account or chattel paper which is transferred by the seller
to a secured party, and if the goods are returned to or are
repossessed by the seller or the secured party, the following rules
determine priority."80 The court found the conditions to the
operation of the priority rules of section 9-306(5) were fulfilled:81
The sale of equipment resulted in chattel paper; the chattel paper
was transferred to Borg-Warner, a secured party; and the goods
were repossessed by the secured party.82
Pursuant to section 355.9-306(5)(a), if a creditor's security
interest had attached to goods prior to their sale, the security
I KRS § 355.1-201(32).
7' See KRS § 355.1-201(44) for the definition of value.
- KRS § 355.9-306(5).
1, See 669 S.W.2d at 546.
12 See text accompanying notes 70-72 supra.
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interest reattaches to the goods upon their repossession if the
debt of the secured creditor remains unpaid:"3 "If the goods
were collateral at the time of sale for an indebtedness of the
seller which is still unpaid, the original security interest attaches
again to the goods and continues as a perfected security interest
if it was perfected at the time when the goods were sold.' '84
Prior to its sale, the equipment represented part of the collateral
for the perfected security interest of Case.85 The debt to Case
remained unpaid throughout the sale of equipment, assignment
of chattel paper, and repossession of the equipment . 6 Accord-
ingly, although Case's security interest had been extinguished as
to the equipment, section 355.9-306(5)(a) reattached the security
interest to the equipment upon its repossession.
The logic of reattaching the security interest to the repos-
sessed goods is valid. When the equipment was sold, Case's
security interest in the equipment was extinguished, but its se-
curity interest continued in the chattel paper proceeds of the
equipment. When the goods were repossessed due to the pur-
chaser's default in payment, the chattel paper no longer had
value since the purchaser obviously was not going to continue
making payments pursuant to the chattel paper. The only secu-
rity for Island's obligation to Case was the repossessed equip-
ment.
The same logic applies to a secured party in the situation of
Borg-Warner, and Article Nine provides the same result. KRS
section 355.9-306(5)(b) provides the "unpaid transferee of the
chattel paper [Borg-Warner] has a security interest in the goods
[the repossessed equipment] against the transferor." Borg-War-
ner expected payment through the chattel paper which became
valueless due to default. Article Nine gave Borg-Warner a se-
curity interest in the goods and thus the goods represented a
fund for the payment of the debt.
83 D. LEMSON & R. NowKA, supra note 17, at 789. The § (5)(a) secured party is
generally an inventory secured party since sale and return, or sale and repossession,
typically happen in the sale of inventory situation.
KRS § 355.9-306(5)(a).
" 669 S.W.2d at 544-45.
Id. at 546.
' See D. LEmsON & R. NowKA, supra note 17, at 789.
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This scenario created a priority conflict in the equipment
between Case and Borg-Warner. Arguably, either of two para-
graphs of section 355.9-306(5) could have resolved the conflict,
with a different result under each paragraph. Section 355.9-
306(5)(b) provides: "Such security interest [the security interest
given the unpaid transferee, i.e., Borg-Warner] is prior to a
security interest asserted under paragraph (a) [9-306(5)(a), i.e.,
Case] to the extent that the transferee of the chattel paper was
entitled to priority under KRS 355.9-308." 88 The priority in the
goods under (5)(b) is given to the secured party who had priority
in the chattel paper, in this instance, Borg-Warner.8 9 Section 9-
306(5)(d) provides: "A security interest of an unpaid transferee
asserted under paragraph (b) or (c) [Borg-Warner] must be per-
fected for protection against creditors [Case °] of the transferor
[Island] and purchasers of the returned or repossessed goods."
Under (5)(d), the unpaid transferee is given priority over other
creditors if it has perfected its security interest. Borg-Warner
had not perfected its security interest and thus was not given
priority over the perfected security interest of Case.
In its original opinion, the court of appeals decided the
priority issue by applying the provisions of section 355.9-
306(5)(d). 91 The court noted the priority scheme of (5)(b) and
stated Borg-Warner would have had priority in the equipment
to the extent it had priority in the chattel paper. 92 The court
then made the following finding:
KRS 355.9-306(5)(d), however, requires that the security inter-
est assertable under KRS 355.9-306(5)(b) or (c) by a transferee
of chattel paper must be perfected for protection against cred-
itors of the transferor. Although Borg-Warner's lien in the
equipment existed pursuant to KRS 355.9-306(5)(b), it was
inferior to the reattached lien of Case because of Borg-War-
ner's failure to perfect. 93
- KRS § 355.9-306(5)(b).
"' See text accompanying notes 76-77 supra.
10 Case is considered a "creditor" of Island under the UCC's definition of creditor.
KRS § 355.1-201(12) provides creditor "includes ... a secured creditor."
1, See 30 KLS 12, at 4 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 1983).
92 Id.
" Id. Although the court did not note the perfected status of Case, the secured
creditor in Case's position is considered to have a perfected security interest in the
repossessed goods if "the security interest was originally perfected by a filing which is
still effective." KRS § 355.9-306(5)(a). Thus, Case, a perfected secured party, would
defeat Borg-Warner, an unperfected secured party pursuant to KRS § 355.9-301(1)(a).
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Thus, the court held Borg-Warner's security interest inferior to the
security interest of Case."4
The court of appeals seems to have chosen (5)(d) over (5)(b)
on the basis of language in a comment to the Official Text of
the Uniform Commercial Code:
For protection against dealer's creditors or purchasers from
him (other than buyers in the ordinary course of business, see
Section 9-307), Bank X [here, Borg-Warner] as the transferee,
under paragraph (5)(d), must perfect its interest by taking
possession of the [equipment] or by filing as to it. Perfection
of his original interest in the chattel paper or the account does
not automatically carry over to the [equipment], as it does
under paragraph (5)(a) where the secured party originally fi-
nanced the dealer's inventory. 95
The court focused on the above part of the comment not-
withstanding language in the same comment as follows:
In the situation covered by (5)(b) and (5)(c) a secured party
who financed the inventory and a secured party to whom the
chattel paper or the account was transferred may both claim
the returned goods - the inventory financier under paragraph
(5)(a), the transferee under paragraphs (5)(b) and (5)(c). With
respect to chattel paper, section 9-308 regulates the priorities. 96
This paragraph of the comment indicates that (5)(d) has no
application to the conflict between a (5)(a) secured party and a
(5)(b) secured party. Thus, Borg-Warner's failure to perfect its
security interest in the goods was of no relevance, because (5)(b)
does not consider perfection a requirement for priority.
On rehearing the court reconsidered the issue of which par-
agraph of KRS section 355.9-306(5) governs priority and ulti-
mately determined priority on the basis of section 9-306(5)(b).
This switch in rationale seems to be based on the operation of
UCC section 9-306(5) as interpreted by Grant Gilmore, one of
the principal drafters of Article Nine. The court's opinion quotes
two passages from Gilmore's treatise on security interests which
support the conclusion that (5)(b) rather than (5)(d) governs the
See 30 KLS 12, at 4.
, See id. (quoting UCC § 9-306 comment 4 (1962)).
UCC § 9-306 comment 4 (1962).
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priority question in issue. Professor Gilmore's analysis-includ-
ing the passages quoted by the court-follows: 97
The second sentence of paragraph (b) regulates the prior-
ities in the goods between an unpaid inventory lender and an
unpaid transferee of the chattel paper: reasonably enough, the
chattel paper transferee wins if he took the chattel paper under
circumstances which entitled him to priority over the inventory
lender's claim to the chattel paper either as proceeds or as the
result of some 'new transaction' relating to the paper itself.
The priorities established by § 9-308 at the time of the chattel
paper transaction thus survive the destruction of the chattel
paper and continue in the returned or repossessed goods. The
one point of difficulty is whether the chattel paper transferee's
interest must be kept at all times perfected in order to prevail
over the inventory lender's interest which "attaches again"
when the goods are returned or repossessed and, let us assume,
"continues perfected" under a still effective filing ... Al-
though section 9-306(5) does not make the point expressly, it
is believed that the transferee, [Borg-Warner] even though his
interest has become unperfected, retains his priority over the
inventory lender, [Case] even though the latter's interest con-
tinues perfected ... The chattel paper transferee [Borg- War-
ner] took priority over the inventory lender [Case] at the time
of the chattel paper transaction; paragraph (b) continues those
priorities with respect to the goods; lapse of the transferee's
interest should not disturb the priorities. That this was the
intended result is quite clear from paragraph (d) of subsection
(5), which provides that a transferee's claim under paragraph
(b) "must be perfected for protection against creditors of the
transferor and purchasers of the returned or repossessed goods. "
The apparent inference is that the transferee's claim need not
be perfected for protection against the paragraph (a) claim of
the inventory lender (who is not aptly described as either a
"creditor" or a "'purchaser of the ... goods").91
Professor Gilmore's interpretation of section 9-306(5) is sub-
stantial authority, 99 but not the only authority, in favor of the
The emphasized portions represent the quotations contained in the court of
appeals' opinion. See 669 S.W.2d at 546-47.
01 G. GIMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 27.5, at 738-39
(1965) (emphasis added).
19 See D. LEIBSON & R. NOWKA, supra note 17, at 789-90.
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interpretation adopted by the court of appeals. The language of
section 9-306(5)(b) itself specifically applies to the conflict be-
tween (5)(a) and (5)(b) secured parties.' °° Section 9-306(5)(d)
applies only because the Uniform Commercial Code's definition
of creditors includes a secured creditor.' 0 ' As noted above, the
comment to the Official Text also speaks specifically to the
situation and gives priority in accordance with the priorities
established as to the chattel paper. 0 2 The logic of employing
(5)(b) rather than (5)(d) is valid. Without repossession, both
parties have conflicting security interests in the chattel paper.
Since the chattel paper is now without value, the UCC gives
both parties a security interest in the repossessed goods and
continues the priority established between the parties as to the
chattel paper. Thus, the language of section 9-306(5), the com-
ment to section 9-306(5), the commentators, and logic all support
application of section 9-306(5)(b) to decide the priority issue.
Once it was established that (5)(b) should determine the
priority issue, the issue became determining who had priority in
the chattel paper. The court considered this question and cor-
rectly found that Borg-Warner had priority in the chattel pa-
per. 103 Accordingly, Borg-Warner was given priority in the
repossessed goods."° Borg-Warner's failure to perfect its security
interest in the goods was of no consequence since (5)(b) does
not require perfection for priority.105
110 See text accompanying note 88 supra.
130 See note 90 supra.
102 See UCC § 9-306(5) comment 4 (1962).
10. See text accompanying notes 76-77 supra.
1o See 669 S.W.2d at 546.
101 Although § 9-306(5) gives no reason for not requiring perfection of the security
interest, a possible rationale is as follows. As noted, § 9-306(5)(b) simply maintains the
priority determined under § 9-308. While the language of § 9-308 does not literally
require perfection by the purchaser of chattel paper in order to achieve priority, com-
pliance with the conditions for priority mandated by § 9-308 results in a perfected
security interest. (Note that pursuant to KRS § 355.9-102(l)(b) Article Nine applies even
when the transaction is a sale of chattel paper.) A security interest is perfected when it
has attached and the applicable steps required for perfection have been taken. KRS §
355.9-303(1). The security interest of the chattel paper purchaser has attached because
the debtor has rights in the collateral (debtor was owner of the chattel paper), the
secured party has given value (under § 355.9-308 the chattel paper purchaser must have
given new value), and the collateral is in the possession of the secured party (under §
355.9-308 the purchaser must take possession of the chattel paper). KRS §§ 355.9-203(1),
.9-204(1). The applicable step required for perfection is taken when the purchaser takes
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One question remains: to whom does the priority rule of
section 9-306(5)(d) apply? It applies to creditors other than the
(5)(a) secured party and to purchasers of the repossessed or
returned collateral.1°6 The following example illustrates the op-
eration of (5)(d). Suppose Gannon is an unpaid transferee of
chattel paper who repossesses the collateral and places it with
the transferor's inventory. Article Nine gives Gannon a security
interest, but Gannon takes no steps to perfect it. If Kean pur-
chases the collateral, or alternatively if Kean recovers a judgment
against the "transferor" and levies on the collateral, Gannon's
interest will be inferior to Kean's. 10 7 Once the goods are returned
to the transferor's/debtor's inventory, it is possible that other
creditors could acquire an interest in the collateral or that some-
one might buy the collateral. If those parties had no notice of
Gannon's unperfected security interest, they should take free of
it. Thus, section 9-306(5)(d) requires perfection of the transfer-
ee's interest for protection against subsequent creditors and pur-
chasers.
III. A LiTTLE HORsiNG AROUND BY THE
KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS
In North Ridge Farms, Inc. v. Trimble, 10 a buyer of breeding
season rights in a fractional share of a thoroughbred horse
asserted its priority against a secured creditor with a security
interest in the fractional share. This case is notable from two
aspects. It appears to be the first time a Kentucky appellate
court considered a security interest in a thoroughbred horse.
possession of the chattel paper. KRS §§ 355.9-302, .9-305. Thus, the chattel paper
purchaser, e.g., Borg-Warner, has in fact perfected its security interest in the chattel
paper by fulfilling the requirements of § 355.9-308 and has a superior interest over the
claimant, e.g., Case, of the chattel paper merely as proceeds of inventory. Since § 355.9-
306(5)(b) simply carries over the § 355.9-308 priority, no perfection as to the goods
themselves is necessary.
10 See D. LEMSON & R. NowiK, supra note 17, at 790.
,o Of course this result assumes Kean complied with either KRS § 355.9-301(1)(c)
as a purchaser or with KRS § 355.9-301(l)(b) as a lien creditor. Note also that the § 9-
306(5)(d) creditor could be a secured creditor who takes a security interest in the goods
subsequent to their return to inventory.
"1 30 KLS 15, at 2 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 1983), discretionary rev. granted, 31
KLS 15, at 19 (Ky. Nov. 9, 1984). The Kentucky Supreme Court heard the case on
April 25, 1985.
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Moreover, the horse involved in the controversy was Affirmed,
thoroughbred racing's last Triple Crown winner.
Louis E. Wolfson, owner of Affirmed, had entered into a
syndication agreement regarding the thoroughbred, with Combs
Stallion Inc. as syndication manager. The agreement provided
that ownership of Affirmed would be divided into thirty-six
equal shares. Each share included voting rights regarding replace-
ment of the syndicate manager and removal of Affirmed to
another farm. Each share also entitled its owner to nominate
one mare per breeding season to be bred to Affirmed.'0 In
January of 1979, Anita Arbour purchased one fractional share
of Affirmed. As part of the consideration for the purchase,
Arbour gave Wolfson a promissory note secured by a security
interest in the fractional share.
In July of 1979, Arbour purchased a filly from North Ridge
Farms, Inc. In downpayment, Arbour assigned to North Ridge
her 1982 breeding season right to nominate a mare to be bred
to Affirmed. Arbour subsequently defaulted on payment of a
promissory note representing the balance due for the purchase
of the filly. As a result, the purchase agreement was rescinded
and two new agreements were executed in May of 1980. These
agreements cancelled the promissory note and provided that
Arbour would sell her 1982 breeding rights in Affirmed to North
Ridge for $50,000.11 0
The syndication agreement allowed the owner of a fractional
share to sell, transfer or assign annual breeding seasons, pro-
vided notice of such transfer was given to the syndicate manager
within ten days of the transfer. Combs Stallion indicated it
would not approve the transfer of the breeding season because
Arbour was in default under the terms of the syndication agree-
ment.'
In 1981, Wolfson, upon Arbour's default of her obligation
under the syndication agreement, repossessed Arbour's fractional
'" Id. The court noted that the primary benefit of share ownership is the right to
an annual nomination of a mare. See id.
10 Id. In the agreement Arbour warranted her title to the 1982 breeding season
nomination to be free of liens and encumbrances except for Wolfson's security interest.
Id.
I Id. at 3. Note, however, the syndication agreement did not require the syndicate
manager's approval, but only that notice be given. See id. at 2.
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share of Affirmed and gave notice he would sell the share unless
it was redeemed pursuant to KRS section 355.9-506.112 In a
private sale held on October 5, 1981, Stathatos and Malisos, two
other creditors of Arbour with security interests in the share,
"redeemed Wolfson's rights in the collateral; and Wolfson ac-
knowledged that all his right, title and interest in the collateral
was thereupon transferred to Stathatos and Malisos [the two
secured creditors]."' 3
As a result of the various transfers, North Ridge claimed, as
a purchaser, Arbour's 1982 breeding season right in Affirmed,
and Stathatos and Malisos claimed the breeding season pursuant
to their "redemption" of Wolfson's security interest rights. Thus,
the court found the issue to be whether North Ridge purchased
Arbour's 1982 breeding rights free of the security interest of
Wolfson (now Stathatos and Malisos) in Arbour's fractional
share. 114
The court ultimately held North Ridge did purchase Arbour's
1982 breeding rights in Affirmed free of the security interest." 5
In deciding this issue, the court applied and analyzed sections
of UCC Article Nine which were unnecessary to its decision.
Since the issue was whether the security interest survived the sale
to North Ridge, the court could have begun and ended with a
consideration of KRS section 355.9-306(2).
KRS section 355.9-306(2) provides:
Except where this article otherwise provides, a security
interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange
or other disposition thereof by the debtor unless his action was
authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or
otherwise. .. ."
,,2 Id. KRS § 355.9-506 provides that after default the debtor or other secured
party with a security interest in the collateral may redeem the collateral before the
disposition upon "tendering fulfillment of all obligations secured by the collateral."
Note that the notice of sale required by KRS § 355.9-504 does not require the secured
party to give notice of the redemption rights.
,3 30 KLS 15, at 3. Although the opinion states Stathatos and Malisos "redeemed
Wolfson's rights" in the collateral, it would seem that in reality Wolfson must have
assigned them his rights in the collateral, i.e., his rights under the security interest. This
conclusion is reached because under KRS § 355.9-506 it is the collateral that is redeemed,
not the secured party's right, title and interest.
114 Id.
"I d. at 5.
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The court noted its disagreement with the circuit court's
finding that this section was "inapplicable" to the sale of the
breeding season." 6 Section 355.9-306(2) determines whether a
security interest in collateral which has been sold is terminated
or continues notwithstanding the sale." 7 If the security interest
in the collateral is terminated, the buyer of the collateral takes
it free of the security interest; if not, the buyer takes the collat-
eral subject to the security interest. 1 8
In order for the security interest in the collateral to be
terminated, the court must find that the secured party authorized
the sale of the collateral. According to section 9-306(2), this
authorization can be contained in the security agreement itself
or the sale can be "otherwise" authorized. This "otherwise"
authorization includes authorizations which are implied by a
secured party's conduct." 9 It should also include written permis-
sion to sell found in documents other than the security agree-
ment. 20 Since authorization to sell can be implied by conduct
alone, an even stronger case for authorization arises when per-
mission to sell is expressed in a written agreement.12'
The court noted the language of the syndication agreement
which "entitled Arbour as owner of Fractional Interest No. 17
to sell, transfer or assign her annual breeding seasons provided
she gave written notice of such a transfer to the syndicate
manager within 10 days after the transfer."' 22 Relying on this
provision, the court found the syndication agreement clearly
authorized the sale of breeding seasons. 23
The syndicate manager would not approve the sale to North
Ridge because Arbour was in default under the syndication
agreement. 24 However, the court found this default to be of no
consequence to the operation of KRS section 355.9-306.'2 The
court stated that, since the syndication agreement set forth no
116 See id. at 4.
117 See D. LIEBSON & R. NowKA, supra note 17, § 8.4(D), at 782-84.
", Id.
11 See id. at 783-84. See also id. at 886 nn.621-22.
See id. at 784.
See id. at 784-85.
,2 30 KLS 15, at 2.
See id. at 5.
See id. at 3.
See id. at 5.
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conditions or exceptions to the free transferability of breeding
seasons, the fact Arbour had defaulted was irrelevant to her
ability to transfer a breeding season.' 26 The court also stated
that the syndicate manager's approval was not necessary since
the syndication agreement "required ... merely notice of the
sale.' 127 Clearly the sale of the breeding season was authorized;
the only issue remaining was whether the sale of the breeding
season constituted a sale of "collateral."
As defined by KRS section 355.9-105(1)(c) "collateral" means
the property subject to a security interst. 128 The collateral for
Wolfson's security interest was Arbour's ownership of a share
of Affirmed. One right of ownership was the annual right to
nominate a mare to be bred to Affirmed. Thus, the right to the
breeding season was part of the "collateral." The sale of a part
of the collateral is no less a sale of collateral contemplated by
KRS section 355.9-306(2) than a sale of the whole of the collat-
eral. 29 An analogy to a more typical sale of part of the collateral
may be helpful. If the collateral for a security interest consists
of "all the debtor's inventory" a sale of one unit of the inven-
tory is still deemed a sale of collateral even though the whole
of the collateral is not sold. 30
The court of appeals had no difficulty in finding the sale of
the breeding season constituted a sale of collateral:
There is no question that the 1982 breeding season was 'col-
lateral,' being as it was a part of what was conveyed by
126 Id.
127 Id.
'u KRS § 355.9-105(l)(c) states that, "collateral means the property subject to a
security interest, and includes accounts, contract rights and chattel paper which have
been sold." Id.
129 See KRS § 355.2-105(3) which allows a "sale of a part interest in existing
identified goods." The court in North Ridge Farms stated:
[T]here may be a part interest of a sale in goods: we have held that
Fractional Interest No. 17 in the hands of Arbour was itself goods, spe-
cifically a farm product. However, sale of the 1982 breeding season con-
veyed nothing more than the right to breed the horse during that limited
time period; it conveyed no actual ownership interest or fractional interest.
We hold that the 1982 breeding season in the hand of North Ridge is
classifiable as a "general intangible."
30 KLS 15, at 4.
10 However, the Court stated that "a precise definition of the breeding season is
unnecessary for purposes of KRS § 355.9-306." Id. at 5. See also note 131 infra.
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Fractional Interest No. 17; that it was personal property; that
it was included in the definition of collateral.... [131]
Therefore the security interest in the 1982 breeding season
terminated when Arbour sold same to North Ridge....
We hold that the trial court erred in falling to hold that
by virtue of KRS 355.9-306 appellant, North Ridge Farms,
Inc., purchased the 1982 Affirmed breeding season from Ar-
bour free and clear of the security interest of Wolfson.... 132
As the quotation clearly indicates, the analysis of KRS sec-
tion 355.9-306(2) determined whether North Ridge purchased the
breeding rights free of the security interest. However, for unex-
plained reasons, 13 3 the court chose to consider the applicability
of other sections of the UCC to security interests in fractional
shares of a thoroughbred horse.
The court considered whether North Ridge bought the breed-
ing season free of the security interest pursuant to KRS section
355.9-307(1).134 This section provides that a buyer in the ordinary
course of business takes free of a perfected security interest
created by his seller. 35 A buyer in the ordinary course of business
is defined by KRS section 355.1-201(9):
"Buyer in ordinary course of business" means a person who
in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in
violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a third
party in the goods buys in ordinary course from a person in
the business of selling goods of that kind but does not include
a pawnbroker.
"1 30 KLS 15, at 5. There is no reason to determine the classification of the
"collateral"-e.g., inventory, chattel paper, general intangibles, farm product-because
KRS § 355.9-306(2) does not depend on the classification but on whether the "collateral"
was sold. Thus the only inquiry is whether the breeding season represents "collateral."
"3 Id.
" The court stated that the "application of the Uniform Commercial Code to the
thoroughbred horse industry in Kentucky presents its own unusual problems in analysis
and interpretation of the character of various transactions that are common in the
business." See id. at 3. Perhaps the court simply wanted to give guidance to practitioners
dealing with security interests in this type of collateral since no Kentucky case appears
to have interpreted Kentucky's Uniform Commercial Code as applied to this situation.
11 See 30 KLS 15, at 4 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 1983).
:3 See KRS § 355.9-307(l).
1985]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
Although the requirements for section 355.9-307(1) protec-
tion are numerous, 136 its benefit is great-a buyer meeting the
requirements takes the collateral free of the security interest.
The circuit court had held KRS section 355.9-307(1) inappl-
icable because North Ridge had not bought the breeding season
in accordance with the statutory definition of buying.
137
As the court of appeals noted: KRS section 355.1-201(9)
defines "buying" (part of the definition of a buyer in the
ordinary course of business) to exclude a transfer "in total or
partial satisfaction of a money debt."' 38
Because Arbour attempted to assign the 1982 breeding season
to North Ridge as a down payment for the purchase of the
filly ... but later sold the breeding season to North Ridge for
$50,000 in conjunction with her return of the filly for inability
to pay for it, the trial court found that the sale to North Ridge
was at least in partial satisfaction of a debt from Arbour to
North Ridge. .... 139
Thus, if Arbour's sale of breeding rights to North Ridge
was, as the circuit court found, in partial satisfaction of a money
debt, North Ridge did not buy the breeding season and could
not be a "buyer in the ordinary course of business."
The sale price of the filly purchased by Arbour from North
Ridge was $170,000. The consideration for the sale consisted of
the breeding season and a promissory note in the amount of
$95,000. Thus, it appears the breeding season was valued at
$75,000. When Arbour defaulted on the promissory note, the
sales agreement was rescinded, and two new agreements were
executed wherein the $95,000 promissory note was cancelled and
North Ridge purchased the breeding season of Affirmed for
$50,000. Given this difference in valuation of the breeding sea-
son,' 4° the circuit court could have reasoned that part of the
136 The requirements are: (1) good faith; (2) without knowledge that the sale violates
the ownership rights or security interest of a third person; (3) buys; (4) in ordinary
course; (5) from a person engaged in the business of selling goods of the kind involved;
and (6) security interest is created by buyer's "seller." See KRS §§ 355.1-201(9) & 355.9-
307(1). See also D. LamSON & R. NowKA, supra note 17, § 8.4(C) at 756.
1 30 KLS 15, at 4.
138 See KRS § 355.1-201(9).
131 30 KLS 15, at 4.
,40 The contract to purchase the filly was executed in July of 1979, while the
agreements after the default were entered into in May of 1980. There is nothing to
indicate that the value of a breeding season to Affirmed declined in value over that 10
month period.
[VoL. 73
CoMMERIAL LAW
consideration North Ridge paid for the breeding season was
forbearance or cancellation of its rights against Arbour-those
rights consisting of a money debt Arbour owed North Ridge as
a consequence of Arbour's breach. Following this logic to its
conclusion, the consideration North Ridge gave for the purchase
of that breeding season was satisfaction of a preexisting money
debt, and North Ridge would not be a buyer in the ordinary
course of business.1 41 The court of appeals, however, did not
base its rejection of North Ridge's buyer in the ordinary course
of business status on the definition of "buying."
The court noted that it was inclined to decide the section
355.9-307(1) issue on the fact that Arbour was not "in the
business of selling goods of [the] kind" involved in the trans-
action. 42 Basing a decision on that requirement would have
mandated a finding that Arbour was not a person in the business
of selling breeding seasons.
The Official Comment to section 9-307 defines the require-
ment as relating "primarily to inventory."'' 43 Many cases are in
agreement.' 44 Thus, in order to buy from a person "in the
business of selling goods of that kind," it can be argued the
buyer must be buying a seller's inventory.145 When a buyer buys
goods held for resale, i.e., inventory, she is buying them from
a person in the business of selling that kind of goods. Even
assuming that breeding seasons can be characterized as inven-
tory, 46 the facts noted in the opinion do not indicate whether
141 See, e.g., Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co., 358 F. Supp. 630, 639 (S.D. Ohio
1973) (plaintiff's purchase was partial satisfaction of preexisting debt; therefore, plaintiff
was not "buyer in the ordinary course."); Osborn v. First Nat'l Bank, 472 P.2d 440,
442 (Okla. 1970) (where sale is made to creditor upon satisfaction of antecedent indebt-
edness, creditor is not "buyer in ordinary course of business."); Chrysler Credit Corp.
v. Malone, 502 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (since transfer of automobile
was in partial satisfaction of money debt transferor owed to transferee of automobile,
transferee was not "buyer in the ordinary course of business.").
W' See 30 KLS 15, at 4. Being "in the business of selling goods of that kind" is a
requirement of buyer in ordinary course of business status. KRS § 355.1-201(9) (1970).
141 See UCC § 9-307 comment 2 (1962).
-" See, e.g., Al Maroone Ford, Inc. v. Manheim Auto Auction, Inc., 208 A.2d
290, 292 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1965) ("Under our cases a sale in the ordinary course normally
means a sale from inventory."); Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Ksenych, 252
N.W.2d 220, 223 (S.D. 1977) ("[T]he terminology of the article is primarily restricted
to inventory.").
"4 See KRS § 355.9-109(4).
"' See KRS § 355.9-109(4) which provides that "inventory" is a subcategory of
"goods." Thus a breeding season must also be characterized as a "good" for KRS §
355.9-307(1) protection.
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Arbour was in the business of selling breeding seasons. However,
neither the language of section 355.9-307(1) nor the language of
section 355.1-201(9) requires the sale to be of inventory. As one
court has held, the requirement is that the purchase be made
from a seller in the business of selling goods of that kind, not
that the goods be inventory. 147 Thus, if the facts indicate Arbour
was a seller of breeding seasons, North Ridge could argue it had
fulfilled that criterion.
Even if Arbour were a person who sells breeding seasons,
North Ridge would still have a difficult time meeting the buyer
in the ordinary course of business standard for the reason on
which the court of appeals ultimately focused. Although "in-
clined" to preclude North Ridge from section 355.9-307(1) pro-
tection because Arbour was not in the business of selling breeding
seasons, the court instead denied North Ridge this protection on
the ground that the breeding season was not a good. 145 Although
the language of section 9-307(1) does not limit its protection to
buyers of goods the Official Comment to that section clearly
shows that this was the intent of the drafters: "This section
states when buyers of goods take free of a security interest even
though perfected. ' 149 Moreover, section 355.1-201(9) provides:
"Buyer in the ordinary course of business" means a person
who in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him
is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a
third party in the goods buys in ordinary course from a person
in the business of selling goods of that kind but does not
include a pawnbroker.5 0
Accordingly, it seems certain that the buyer must be buying goods.
"Goods" are defined in section 355.9-105(l)(f):
"Goods" includes all things which are movable at the time the
security interest attaches or which are fixtures, but does not
include money, documents, instruments, accounts, chattel pa-
147 See In re Morristown Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 25 Bankr. 377, 388 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1982) ("The statutory definition of buyer in the ordinary course of business does
not require a conclusion that the goods purchased were inventory.").
141 See 30 KLS 15, at 4. See also note 129 supra.
149 See UCC § 9-307 comment 1 (1962) (emphasis added).
I- KRS § 355.1-201(9) (emphasis added).
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per, general intangibles, contract rights and other things in
action. "Goods" also includes the unborn young of animals
and growing crops.
A breeding season is part of the bundle of rights which
comprise a fractional ownership interest in a horse. To be a
good, the breeding season must be movable, and it seems im-
possible that a breeding season can fulfill this requirement. The
Official Comment to section 9-105 states that the Article Nine
definition of goods is similar to the Article Two definition.151
The Article Two definition also speaks in terms of goods being
"movable.' 5 2 However, both the Article Nine and the Article
Two definitions specifically include the unborn young of ani-
mals, a type of personal property which also seems to be hard
pressed to be "movable," as goods. 153 Thus, possibly in antici-
pation of the argument that such property should not be consid-
ered "movable," the UCC made a specific inclusion for that
type of property.
Whether a breeding season constitutes a good is certainly
debatable. The court of appeals chose to characterize a breeding
season as a general intangible.154 " 'General intangibles' means
any personal property (including things in action) other than
goods, accounts, contract rights, chattel paper, documents and
instruments."1 55 Given the problems of characterizing a breeding
season, this issue will not be extensively discussed since North
Ridge did not need to rely on KRS section 355.9-307(1) to protect
itself from the security interest. 15 6 As previously discussed, North
Ridge clearly had a superior interest in the breeding season since
its authorized sale extinguished the security interest in the season.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals held that North Ridge, because
it did not buy "goods," did not come within the protection KRS
section 355.9-307(1) affords a buyer in the ordinary course of
business. 57
"I See UCC § 9-105 comment 3 (1962).
112 See KRS § 355.2-105(1).
See KRS §§ 355.2-105(1), .9-105(1)(f).
'5' See 30 KLS 15, at 4.
"' KRS § 355.9-106.
116 See notes 115-132 supra and accompanying text.
I" See 30 KLS 15, at 4.
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The court of appeals also deemed it important to decide how
the fractional share in Affirmed should be characterized. s5 The
choices for characterization of the breeding season seemed to be
either as a good or as a general intangible.'5 9 Of course Affirmed
is a "good" and since Article Two allows a sale of a part
interest in goods '60 it can be argued, as the court of appeals
noted, that "division of [Affirmed's] ownership between or
among several individuals should have no effect on the existing
status as 'goods.""'1 6' However, as also noted by the court, the
primary value of a fractional share lies in the breeding rights.' 62
It could be argued that the breeding rights are the collateral and
that the collateral, thus, seems to be a general intangible. 63
Resolving this issue requires considering what was sold to
Arbour. "The syndicate agreement ... purported to convey
undivided interests in the stallion and specifically categorized the
owners of the fractional shares as tenants in common."' 64 Among
the ownership rights were entitlement to nominate one mare per
breeding season to be bred to Affirmed and voting rights relating
to control of Affirmed which enable a majority of shareowners
to move the stallion to another farm or to replace the syndicate
manager.165 Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the primary
economic benefit of owning a share was breeding rights, own-
ership also entailed additional rights.
While a breeding right seemed to be properly characterized
as a general intangible, ownership of an undivided interest in a
good seems to rise above a general intangible and attain the
status of goods. As the court stated: " We believe that [Arbour]
purchased, as a tenant in common, an actual part ownership in
"I See id. at 4. Note that the characterization of the collateral was not necessary
to enable North Ridge to have a superior right in the breeding season pursuant to KRS
§ 355.9-306(2). See text accompanying notes 128-133 supra.
'19 See 30 KLS 15, at 3-5. Neither "contract right" nor "account" in KRS § 355.9-
106 seems applicable because both speak in terms of a "right to payment," and a
fractional share of a thoroughbred is not connected with a right to payment.
See KRS § 355.2-105(3).
30 KLS 15, at 3.
162 See id.
"3 See id. at 4-5.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 2.
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the horse and that the nature of that part ownership . . . is that
it is goods."' 66
The court found support for its position in the United States
Tax Court decision of Harry F. Guggenheim. 67 In Guggenheim,
the Internal Revenue Service argued that the sale of fractional
shares of a horse was actually a sale of breeding rights and thus
not within the definition of property that qualified as a capital
asset. 68 The taxpayer argued that the fractional shares repre-
sented undivided ownership interests in the horse and that he
had, thus, sold ownership of a horse-a capital asset. 69 The Tax
Court noted the syndication agreement purported to pass undi-
vided ownership interests and found the rights of a purchaser
of a fractional share are significantly different from the rights
of a purchaser of a breeding season. 70 Although the court be-
lieved that the rights of a shareholder may have no substantial
economic value above the rights of a breeding season holder,
the court noted that the rights of a shareholder "are substantive
indicia of ownership, and, when combined with the form of the
transaction, lead us to believe that the property interests trans-
ferred by the syndication agreement should be considered undi-
vided ownership interests.' 7'
In finding that the fractional share was "goods," the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals did not discuss whether the collateral
was "movable," the primary requirement for goods.172 Since the
syndication agreement provided that the fractional shareholders
owned undivided interests in the horse, each shareholder was
given ownership in the horse, and the horse was movable. Thus,
each fractional share was also "movable."
Even with the above logic, the characterization of a frac-
tional share in a thoroughbred is a difficult issue, and solid
arguments can be made for designating the fractional share as
'6 Id. at 3.
-67 46 T.C. 559 (1966). For a further discussion of the problem of characterization
and support for the characterization of thoroughbred shares as "goods," see Lester,
Security Interests in Thoroughbred and Standardbred Horses: A Transactional Approach,
70 Ky. L.J. 1065, 1076-82 (1981-82).
I" See 46 T.C. at 565.
'69 See id.
110 See id. at 566-67.
"I Id. at 567-68.
'" See 30 KLS 15, at 3; KRS § 355.9-105(1)(f).
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either a good or a general intangible. 73 The court indicated its
characterization of the collateral as goods was largely dependent
on the syndication agreement and then cautioned that such agree-
ments must be "considered individually" in characterization
problems. 74 In any event, the court should have resisted the
temptation to decide a difficult issue unnecessary to resolving
the case. 75
It seems the court's purpose in determining the proper char-
acterization of the collateral was to determine whether the se-
curity interest was perfected by the proper filing of a financing
statement. 76 Characterization of collateral is necessary to deter-
mine whether a financing statement has been properly filed,
since the place of filing depends in part on the nature of the
collateral. 77 However, KRS section 355.9-306(2) operates to ex-
tinguish the security interest, whether perfected or unperfected,
in the collateral sold if the sale was authorized. 78 Thus, whether
the security interest was perfected was irrelevant.
In summary, the Kentucky Court of Appeals properly held
North Ridge had a superior interest in the 1982 breeding season
of Affirmed. The only rationale needed for that holding was
that, under KRS section 355.9-306(2), where the sale of a breed-
ing season is authorized by the secured party, the security interest
in the collateral sold is extinguished.
173 See 30 KLS 15, at 3-4; Lester, supra note 167, at 1079.
174 See 30 KLS 15, at 3.
171 See text accompanying notes 128-133 supra.
176 See 30 KLS 15, at 3-4.
See KRS § 355.9-401(1) (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1984).
' KRS § 355.9-306(2).
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